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Comments
THE BATTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME AS A DEFENSE TO A
HOMICIDE CHARGE UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMES CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
Women do not kill as often as men.' When they do, however, they
most often kill their husbands or boyfriends, 2 frequently in response
to abuse.3
In spite of statistics indicating that spouse abuse is a widespread
problem,4 the legal system generally remains reluctant to become in-
1. See Note, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Potential Defense to a Homi-
cide Charge, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 213, 219 (1978), quoting 1973 statistics com-
piled in D. MARTIN, BATrERED WIVES 14 (1976). See also Schneider, Jordan &
Arguedas, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to
Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 141, 145 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Representation of Women].
Figures on the rate of homicides committed by females vary with the
source. Some authorities report that 15% of all persons arrested on homicide
charges are women. Id., citing R. SIMON, WOMEN AND CRIME 1 (1975); Price,
The Forgotten Female Offender, 23 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 101, 103 (1977).
But see Critics Assail (Linking) Feminism with Women in Crime, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 14, 1976, at 48, cited in Representation of Women, supra, at 145, in
which it is asserted that the rate is 10%. Sources generally agree, however,
that the rate has remained stable. Representation of Women, supra, at 145.
2. Representation of Women, supra note 1, at 145-46; Note, supra note 1,
at 219.
3. Representation of Women, supra note 1, at 141, 145-46.
4. Estimates of the number of families in which spouse battering occurs
range from a low of three million to a high of 40 million. Meyers, Battered
Wives, Dead Husbands, 6 STUDENT LAW. 47 (March 1978). Meyers notes that,
according to one Harris Poll, "20 percent of all Americans, and 25 percent of
those with college educations, condone the use of physical force within mar-
riages. Id. Accurate statistics on the occurrence of spouse abuse are difficult
to compile, however, because of victims' frequent reluctance to report the
crime. Note, supra note 1, at 213. "While there are more police calls involv-
ing family violence than any other criminal activity, the FBI and other law
enforcement experts consider wife beating to be the most under reported crime
in the country." Id. A Delaware study of 57 families suggests the magnitude
of the under-reporting problem, indicating that only one in 270 instances of
wife-beating is ever reported to the authorities. Droskin, Legal Alternatives
for Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers, 6 AMER. ACAD. OF PSYCH. & LAW
BULL. 335, 339 (1978). See also Steinmetz, Wife Beating: A Critique and
Reformulation of Existing Theory, 6 AMER. ACAD. OF PSYCH. & LAW BULL.
322, 323 (1978); Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 135, 136 (1976) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U. Note],
citing Guthrie, The Battered Wife: A Victim of Most Under-reported Crime,
(105)
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volved in domestic disputes 5-a hesitancy which reflects a respect for
basic privacy rights 6 as well as practical considerations.7 Because of the
great deference courts have traditionally given to the sanctity of the
home, and to the family relationship,S events occurring in the home are
thought not to be the concern of police or prosecutors. 9 In addition to
this recognition of a privacy right, practical considerations lead many
police departments to assign wife abuse calls a low priority,10 making
police assistance slow in coming. Police answering domestic calls are
exposed to a relatively high degree of danger, with more officers being
injured or killed as a result of answering domestic dispute calls than
any other type." Furthermore, when police do respond, they often as-
sume more of a "social work rather than enforcement role." 12
Cleveland Press, Nov. 3, 1976, § C at 4, col. 3. This widespread failure to
report domestic violence is generally attributed to fear or shame, and the
inaccuracy of the figures is compounded by inadequate recording by the
responsible agencies. N.Y.U. Note, supra, at 136.
5. Representation of Women, supra note 1, at 147. Some commentators
suggest that the "law becomes ambiguous when the parties are living as man
and wife." Eisenberg & Seymoor, The Self Defense Plea and Battered Women,
14 TRIAL 34, 35 (July-1978) [hereinafter cited as Self Defense Plea].
6. See notes 8 & 10 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes I1 & 14 and accompanying text infra.
8. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the
Supreme Court sustained a challenge to a law prohibiting the use, and advice
as to the use, of contraceptives. Id. at 486. The Court expressed, among
other things, its grave concern that the methods which would be necessary to
enforce the statute's ban on use would involve an unconstitutional intrusion
into the privacy of the marital bedroom. Id. at 485. Emphasizing that the
right of marital privacy is "older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system" the Court rejected the notion
that the government could enter that zone in the manner that the Connecticut
statute would require. Id. at 486. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and cases cited therein.
9. Comment, supra note 1, at 214.
10. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 144, citing HEARING ON MARITAL AND
FAMILY VIOLENCE BEFORE THE SEN. SUBCOMM. ON NUTRITION AND HUMAN
NEEDS OF THE CAL. SEN. HEALTH AND WELFA E COMM. 81 (July 21, 1975)
(Statement of M. Vail).
11. Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 36. According to the 1974 Uniform
Crime Report, 149 officers lost their lives responding to domestic violence calls
between 1965 and 1974. Note, supra note 1, at 215, citing L.A. Times, Feb.
20, 1978, Part IV, at 1, col. 2. Twenty-seven percent of all police deaths
resulted from responding to such calls. Note, supra, at 215. See also N.Y.U.
Note, supra note 4, at 144.
12. Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 36. "[V]ague standards for arrest,
the low percentage of arrests which result in convictions, and the fact that
battered women may not pursue their cases once charges have been filed" are
used as justification for refusal to arrest by police officers called to the scene of
-wife abuse. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 146-47. In addition, law enforce-
ment officers reason that a battering husband, arrested and later released on
bail, is likely to return and do more serious harm to his wife in retaliation for
his arrest. Note, supra note 1, at 215.
[VOL. 26: p. 105,
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Thus, while our criminal laws promise protection from unjusti-
fiable infliction of injury by others,'8 that promise may well ring hollow
to an abused wife. Faced with such adverse circumstances, many
battered women perceive no way to escape, as they generally are de-
pendent upon their batterers economically and psychologically. 14 Dis-
couraged about the possibility of finding protection under the law,' 6
and convinced of their inability to escape,' 6 some battered women are
standing their ground and striking back. 17 While the law specifically,
The Ann Arbor, Michigan Police Training Academy recommends the
following procedure for domestic calls:
a. Avoid arrest if possible. Appeal to vanity.
b. Explain the procedure of obtaining a warrant.
1. Complainant must sign complaint.
2. Must appear in court.
3. Consider loss of time.
4. Cost of court.
c. State that your only interest is breach of peace.
d. Explain that attitudes usually change by court time.
e. Recommend a postponement.
I. Court not in session.
2. No judge available.
f. Do not be too harsh or critical.
Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 36.
While this procedure represents the general attitude toward domestic dis-
putes, it must be noted that some changes have been made. For example, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police formerly classified "most family
disputes [as] 'personal matters requiring no direct action' " and identified officers'
sole purpose once inside the home as that of preserving the peace. N.Y.U. Note,
supra note 4, at 145 (citations omitted). The Association now suggests that
police "treat battered wives as victims of crime and husbands as violent law-
breakers." Id. In Chicago, police guidelines limit officer discretion in domestic
violence cases. Under the guidelines, various aggravating factors-any use of a
weapon, any intentionally inflicted serious injury, and any prior injury, court
appearance or calls to the police-require immediate arrest." Meyers, supra
note 4, at 49.
13. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (1972). The
authors explain: "The protections afforded by the criminal law to the various
interests of society against harm [include] protection from physical harm to the
person." Id. at 21.
14. Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 36, 41. According to the author,
"[m]ost women in that position simply feel imprisoned. The man's physical,
financial, and social advantage has convinced her it is not only impossible but
immoral to escape his brutality." Id. at 41. See also Note, supra note 1, at
219; notes 31-55 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 5-14 and accompanying text supra.
16. See notes 14 supra; 38-55 and accompanying text infra.
17. Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 41; Representation of Women, supra
.note 1, at 149; Note, supra note 1, at 219. Detroit Police Commander James D.
Bannon commented, "You can readily understand why some women ultimately
take the law into their own hands." Self Defense Plea, supra, at 36. Com-
mander Bannon observes as well that it is understandable for the male to feel
.'protected by the system in his use of violence." Id.
1980-1981]
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and society in general, have offered little help to the battered wife,'8
and indeed may be partially responsible for the actions of those who
strike back violently,' 9 many of these women now face homicide charges
brought by that same society and its legal system.20
This comment will focus on the legal controversy surrounding this
emerging phenomenon, analyzing particularly how Pennsylvania's crimi-
nal law might accommodate a homicide defense based on the Battered
Spouse Syndrome. 2' To most effectively frame the problem for analysis,
three hypothetical situations, representing typical battered spouse factual
contexts, will be set out.22 The law of homicide in Pennsylvania will
then be applied to each situation, both with and without introduction
of the Battered Spouse Syndrome as a possible defense.2
II. THREE REPRESENTATIVE HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS
Hypothetical 1
Archie and Alice had been married for fifteen years. Almost from
the start, Archie beat Alice with some regularity, sexually abusing her
at times and subjecting her to degradation and insults. Archie had also
abused their young child and threatened to kill both Alice and their
daughter. Archie exercised increasing control over Alice's life, driving
her friends away, making her stop working and eventually forbidding
her to have any outside social contacts without him. Alice tried leaving
Archie, but he found her and threatened her life if she refused to come
back. He told her that she and their child would never be free of him.
One night, after a particularly savage beating, Alice waited until
Archie fell asleep, got a knife from the kitchen, and repeatedly stabbed
Archie, killing him.
Hypothetical 2
Bill and Barbara got married right after high school. A former
football player, Bill worked as a laborer and was proud that he had
remained in good physical shape. At six foot-three Bill was a foot taller
than Barbara and weighed almost 100 pounds more than she. When
Bill was sober, he and Barbara had a good relationship. But Bill tended
to drink too much, and when he did, he slapped Barbara around.
Toward the end, Bill had been getting drunk more often and the beat-
18. See notes 5-14 and accompanying text supra.
19. See notes 13-17 and accompanying text supra.
20. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text infra.
21. For a description of the Battered Spouse Syndrome, see notes 24-56 and
;accompanying text infra.
22. See Part II infra.
23. See notes 151-228 and accompanying text infra.
[VOL. 26: p. 105
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ings had become more severe. Although he had never attacked her with
,other than his bare hands, Bill had sent Barbara to the hospital more
than once-the last time with a concussion, cracked ribs and loose teeth.
The scenario was always the same: Bill came home drunk and began
insulting Barbara, the insults turned into threats, and the beating
followed.
When Bill came home drunk the last time and began insulting
Barbara, she reached across the kitchen counter for the knife she had
been using and the first time he came toward her, she stabbed Bill in
the chest, killing him.
Hypothetical 3
Carl had always been an unreasonably jealous husband. In the
five years that he and Cathy were married, he had constantly accused
her of being unfaithful. His accusations were generally accompanied
by threats and physical violence, which seemed to be getting worse with
each incident. Carl was convinced that the baby Cathy was carrying
was not his and had threatened to do away with it and with her.
One night following a particularly ugly insult session, Carl began
beating Cathy, this time delivering many blows to her abdomen and re-
newing his threats against the unborn child. Breaking away from him
momentarily, Cathy lunged for the drawer in her night stand where
she had placed a kitchen knife after the last beating. She turned and
stabbed Carl six times, killing him.
III. THE BATTERED SPOUSE SYNDROME
"Women have always had to defend themselves against physical
and sexual assaults by their husbands, lovers [and] friends," notes one
commentator. 24 What goes on behind closed doors, in the judicially
protected privacy of the family home,25 is often clearly criminal con-
duct.26 Wife beating does not represent merely isolated, unconnected
incidents, but rather "reflects a societal pattern of male violence against
women." 27
24. Representation of Women, supra note 1, at 141.
25. See notes 8 8: 10 and accompanying text supra.
26. Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 35.
27. Meyers, supra note 4, at 50. See Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047,
396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977). In this action, battered wives brought suit,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the New York City Police
Department, Family Court and Probation Department. Id. at 1048, 396 N.Y.S.2d
at 976. The plaintiffs alleged that these three agencies were responsible for
their injuries and that the agencies had neglected their duties to battered
spouses. Id. at 1048-49, 1052, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 976-77, 979. The New York
County Supreme Court dismissed the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment, finding that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action. Id. at 1051-53,
1980-1981]
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Two patterns of domestic violence have been identified by one re-
searcher: 28 the Saturday Night Brawl 29 and the Chronic Battering
Syndrome.3 0 The former involves violent confrontations, often initiated
and generally welcomed by the victim.3 1 In contrast, victims of the
Chronic Battering Syndrome, or Battered Spouse Syndrome, do not pre-
cipitate the violence, but rather seek to avoid the confrontation and
during its course remain passive, trying to protect themselves or to
escape.3 2 They feel powerless and fear that they will be killed.33 It is
the Chronically Battered Spouse that is the key character in this
comment.
One might ask why women, confronted with recurring violent at-
tacks, remain with their attackers. Some commentators suggest that the
women stay because of masochistic tendencies-that, despite their pro-
tests, they enjoy the assaults.3 4 Such theories, however, have been criti-
cized for their superficiality and are being disproved by research.35
Other theories propose that the women who stay with battering spouses
do so because they fear reprisals,3 6 love the batterer and believe his
promises of reform,3 7 or lack reasonable alternatives.38  Another expla-
396 N.Y.S.2d at 977-79. Subsequently, the police department settled with the
plaintiffs and signed a consent order. Bruno v. Codd, 64 A.D.2d 582, 582-83,
407 N.Y.S.2d 165, 66-67 (1978), aJ'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419
N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979). The Probation Department and Family Court appealed
the Supreme Court decision, and the Appellate Division granted their motions
for dismissal and summary judgment. 64 A.D.2d at 582-83, 407 N.Y.S.2d at
167-68. The Court acknowledged the serious problem of spouse abuse, but
found that the plaintiffs' relief lay with the appropriate supervisory agencies
and that judicial intervention would represent an invasion of executive au-
thority. Id. at 583, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 167. Judge Murphy dissented, finding that
the complaint did state a basis for relief founded on discriminatory enforcement
of the law. Id. at 583, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 168 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
28. See Steinmetz, supra note 4.
29. Id. at 323-26. See note 31 and accompanying text infra.
30. Steinmetz, supra note 4, at 326. This Comment will use "Battered
Spouse Syndrome" to refer to what Dr. Steinmetz labels "Chronic Battered
Syndrome." See notes 32-33 and accompanying text infra.
31. Steinmetz, supra note 4, at 323. Either spouse is likely to initiate the
battle on any given occasion. Id. The author quotes some women involved
in the Saturday Night Brawl situation as commenting: "I'd keep at him until
he reached his breaking point . . . . Making up is so much fun after we fight
.... I deserve it, I started the argument." Id. at 324 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 324.
33. Id.
34. Note, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1705,
1709 (1978), citing Snell, Rosenwald & Robey, The Wifebeater's Wife, 11 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCH. 107, 111 (1964).
35. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 141-42. See notes 41-55 and accompany-
ing text infra.
36. Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 36, 41; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4,
at 140.
37. Meyers, supra note 4, at 49; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 140.
38. Meyers, supra note 4, at 48; Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 36, 41;
N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4, at 140-41.
[VOL. 26: p. 105
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nation posits a dehumanizing process in which the woman is stripped of
her independence and the sense of self' worth and is made to feel guilty
and deserving of the beatings she receives.3 9 A similar theory traces the
woman's failure to leave as owing to a pattern of compliance brought
on by an unstable sense of self and a resulting need to please in order
to feel worthwhile.4 0 While some analysts feel that the average battered
spouse exhibits certain inherent psychological characteristics which make
her more compliant in the face of such violence and thus more likely to
end up in a battering relationship, 41 others argue that the dynamics of
domestic violence produce those characteristics and will do so in vir-
tually any subject.42
One researcher suggests that the psychological effects of the Battered
Spouse Syndrome can be compared to classic brainwashing.4 3 Character-
istics identified as the cornerstones of brainwashing 44 are also key factors
identifiable in the Syndrome. 45 Fear, created by the husband's threats
and violence, produces hyper-suggestibility.4 6 This condition is intensi-
fied by isolation,47 which may be either self-imposed by a woman who is
embarrassed by her husband's actions,48 or enforced by the husband,
who might insult his wife's friends, physically bar their entrance, and
prevent his wife from going anywhere without him.4 9 Guilt adds to the
effectiveness of the brainwashing. 50 The husband accuses his wife, gen-
erally of infidelity, and makes her feel guilty, thus convincing her that
she deserves the beatings.51 The combination of fear, isolation and guilt
39. Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 36, 41; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 4,
at 140.
40. Meyers, supra note 4, at 48.
41. Id.
42. Steinmetz, supra note 4, at 326.
43. Id. at 327. Dr. Steinmetz explains:
Brainwashing is made possible by isolating individuals from the
supports and rewards of their previous milieu. This isolation results
in hypersuggestibility and increased receptivity to reinforcement of new
values and behaviors. The only validation of the person's worth is
that offered by the individuals enforcing the isolation. Inconsistent,
confusing, threatening treatment, interspersed with kindness, produces
an effect similar to the submissive, overdependent behavior exhibited
by a child of inconsistent parents.
Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 328-30.
46. Id. at 328. See note 43 supra.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 328-29.
49. Id. at 329.
50. Id.
51. Id.
1980-1981]
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yields yet another element of brainwashing-emotional dependency.5 2
Stripped of her sense of self-worth, of external support, and of personal
confidence, the woman becomes totally dependent upon her attacker.53-
Lack of support from family and professional agencies, evidenced by
frequent suggestions to "give it one more try," further aggravates the
victim's deteriorating psychological condition, reinforcing her negative
estimate of her self worth, and underscoring her belief that she should
not and can not escape.54 The brainwashing is a success.55
Frustration and lack of recourse have created a situation in which
abused women see their only alternatives as submitting to an intolerable
life style, or striking back themselves.60 Ironically, the same courts and
legal system that have failed to offer the battered spouse protection from
her assailant will prosecute her for responding in what she perceives to
be the only way available.57 Women traditionally have lost both their
physical battles and legal battles in this area.58 The woman who strikes
back, killing her attacker, will be confronted with a homicide charge.
Most often, those charged have pleaded either guilty, or not guilty by
reason of insanity.5 9 In either case, such women are routinely found to
have committed unjustifiable acts of homicide.6 0 Some of these women,
however, are now stepping forward and telling the whole story-reveal-
ing the circumstances leading to their actions and asserting a right of
self defense corresponding to that of men.6 ' As a result, juries in some
well-publicized cases have found that the conduct of these women may
not in fact be murder at all, but rather a justified, excusable, or at least
not culpable response to the situation perceived by a battered spouse. 62
52. Id.
53. Id. One battered wife explained: "You put up with six days of beating
because there is one good day to have someone to share things with ...... Id.
54. Id. at 330-31.
55. Id. at 332.
56. Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 34-35; Representation of Women,
supra note 1, at 149.
57. Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 35.
58. Id.
59. Representation of Women, supra note 1, at 141.
60. Id.
61. Id. For a discussion of possible equal protection problems with self
defense doctrines as currently applied, see notes 149-51 and accompanying text
infra.
62. See Self Defense Plea, supra note 5, at 34. The authors describe a
Michigan case where the defendant battered spouse, who had ignited gasoline
which she had poured around her sleeping husband, was acquitted by reason
of temporary insanity; and a California case where a wife charged with her
husband's murder was acquitted when the jury found her action to be self
defense because of her husband's continual beatings. Id. See also Meyers,
supra note 4, at 47.
[VOL. 26: p. 105,
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IV. CRIMINAL HOMICIDE IN PENNSYLVANIA
Society does not punish all killings. Rather, certain killings are
excused as justified,68 and others as accidental. 64 Punishable killings.
constitute a "class of offenses, graded according to the mental state and
moral turpitude of the defendant." 65
Under Chapter 25 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, a person who
"intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes the death of
another human being" commits criminal homicide.6 6  An act, satisfying
63. Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 460 Pa. 201, 205, 331 A.2d 488, 490 (1975);
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 13, at 391-98. See Representation of Women,
supra note 1, at 149, which summarizes justifiable homicides stating: "Persons
who kill in defense of their own lives, [or] the lives of others . . . are entitled
to a determination that the killing was justifiable." Id. For a discussion of
justifiable homicide in Pennsylvania, see notes 135-51 and accompanying text
infra.
64. W. LAFAvE 8 A. ScoTr, supra note 13, at 587.
65. Representation of Women, supra note 1, at 149. See also Common-
wealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 378 A.2d 1189 (1977); Commonwealth v. Moore,
463 Pa. 317, 344 A.2d 850 (1975). The classifications of homicide codified in
the Pennsylvania Crimes Code were discussed and compared at length in a 1977
decision in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated:
The differences between the classifications are largely a function of the
state of mind of the perpetrator. This becomes clear when one exam-
ines the ranking for culpability purposes of the several categories of
criminal homicide. Premeditated, intentional killing ... continue[s]
to be ... the most highly culpabable [class] of criminal homicide.
A felonious and malicious killing without a specific intent to take life
(murder of the third degree, formerly second degree) is placed by the
Code in the next highest degree of culpability, a felony of the first
degree. Next in seriousness is a killing which, although intentional, is
committed when the actor is under the influence of a sudden and
intense passion resulting from serious provocation or is acting in the
unreasonable belief that the circumstances would justify a killing.
This subdivision of criminal homicide, voluntary manslaughter, is
punishable as a felony of the second degree. Involuntary manslaughter
...is committed when the death of a person is caused as a direct
result either of an [sic] lawful act or of an unlawful act done in a
"reckless or grossly negligent manner." In the scale of culpability,
such a killing is a misdemeanor of the first degree.
Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 440-41, 378 A.2d 1189, 1195 (1977)
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
66. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2501 (Purdon 1973). The Pennsylvania
Legislature has statutorily defined the mental elements of criminal homicide as
follows:
(1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature
or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is
aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes
that they exist.
(2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
9
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this general definition of criminal homicide, is then classified, 7 based
on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the killnig,6s as involun-
tary manslaughter,69 voluntary manslaughter, 70 or murder. 1 Similarly,
murder is further subdivided into murder of the first, second and
third degrees.72
A. Murder
"Analysis demonstrates . . . that the . . . classifications of states
of mind are not neat pigeon holes." 73 To raise homicide to the level
of murder, it is essential that the killing be done with malice, in the
legal sense of the word.74 Malice has been said to consist
either of an express intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm,
or of a "wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty,
recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attend-
ant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that
such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct he is aware that
it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and intent of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known
to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
(4) A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure
to perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and
the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(b) (Purdon 1973).
67. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2501(b) (Purdon 1973).
68. Referring to the state of mind classifications, Justice Roberts of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said: "The differences between the several
degrees of homicide are differences in the state of mind of the defendant at the
time of the killing." Commonwealth v. Moore, 463 Pa. 317, 329, 344 A.2d 850,
856 (1975) (Roberts, J., concurring).
69. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (Purdon 1973). Involuntary man-
slaughter will not be discussed further as its unintentional nature places it
outside the scope of this comment which will focus on intentional killing. See
notes 1-3, 15-17 &: 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
70. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503 (Purdon 1973).
71. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981).
72. Id.
73. Commonwealth v. Moore, 463 Pa. 317, 329, 344 A.2d 850, 856 (1975)
(Roberts, J., concurring).
74. Commonwealth v. Carter, 481 Pa. 495, 498-99, 393 A.2d 13, 15 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 466 Pa. 15, 19, 351 A.2d 280, 282 (1976).
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duty" indicating an unjustified disregard for the probability of
death or great bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the
value of human lifeJ 5
The element of malice may be understood by examining the description
given to three 76 of the four types of common law homicide traditionally
characterized as murder-intent-to-kill murder,77 intent-to-do-serious
bodily-injury murder,78 and depraved heart murder.79 From these labels
it becomes clear that malice refers not to ill-will or bad feeling, but
rather to a level of intention or purpose regarding the ultimate death
of another.
Determination of the existence of malice, because it requires dis-
cerning a mental state, is a difficult task, but the courts have approved
certain general approaches. 80 Malice may be inferred from the circum-
stances surrounding a killing,81 and may properly be presumed when a
deadly weapon is directed at any vital part of the human body. 82 An
instrument not ordinarily considered deadly may be so found when it is
used to kill.83
75. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 461 Pa. 557, 559, 337 A.2d 545, 546 (1975),
quoting Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 22-23, 334 A.2d 610, 613 (1975).
76. The fourth type, felony murder, refers to an unintended death brought
about during the commission or attempted commission of a felony, and is not
relevant to the discussion at hand. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 13,
at 545.
77. Id. at 530. "Intent-to-kill" murder involves an actor who sets out
with the specific purpose of taking a life, and actually accomplishes this end.
Id. at 535.
78. Id. at 530. "Serious bodily harm" murder involves a conscious purpose
of doing grave harm, but without the purpose of necessarily causing death.
When a person acts with this state of mind and his acts result in another's
death, he or she is said to have committed serious bodily harm murder. Id. at
540.
79. Id. at 530. LaFave & Scott define depraved heart murder as involving
"[e]xtremely negligent conduct, which creates what a reasonable man would
realize to be . . .a very high risk of death or serious bodily injury to another
or others .... ." Id. at 541.
80. See notes 81-83 and accompanying text infra.
81. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 461 Pa. 557, 560, 337 A.2d 545, 546 (1975),
quoting Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 22, 334 A.2d 610, 613 (1975). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained this concept in a subsequent decision
in which it noted that, "[b]ecause a state of mind by its very nature is sub-
jective, absent a declaration by the actor himself we can only look to the con-
duct and the circumstances surrounding it to determine the mental state which
occasioned it." Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 238, 352 A.2d 30, 37(1976). The court has justified the validity of looking to the conduct and
circumstances by pointing to the general proposition that a person is presumed
to know and intend the probable results of his actions. Id.
82. Commonwealth v. Carter, 481 Pa. 495, 499, 393 A.2d 13, 15 (1978);
Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 238, 352 A.2d 30, 36 (1976).
83. Commonwealth v. Prenni, 357 Pa. 572, 575, 35 A.2d 532, 533 (1947)
(an ax, a baseball bat, an iron bar, and even a bedroom slipper have been held
to be deadly weapons when used in a killing).
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Once the presence of malice establishes a homicide as murder,
further classification occurs. In Pennsylvania, murder itself is broken
down into three levels, based on culpability: murder of the first, second
and third degrees. s4 For the purposes of this Comment, only murder
of the first degree and murder of the third degree will be considered.85
The statute describes murder of the first degree as "an intentional
killing," s and murder of the third degree as "[a]ll other kinds of
murder ...... "87 Attempting to clarify the difference, the statute
further defines intentional killing as "[k]illing by means of poison, or
by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated killing." 88 In wrestling with the somewhat elusive difference
in degrees, courts have often turned to the phrase "specific intent,"
stating that the existence of a specific intent to kill distinguishes murder
of the first degree from murder of the third degree.89 The courts reason
that such intent includes the requisite element of premeditation." On
84. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981). See Com-
monwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 439, 378 A.2d 1189, 1194 (1977).
85. Murder of the second degree, commonly referred to as felony murder,
is described as an unintentional criminal homicide which was "committed
while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetra-
tion of a felony." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981).
Further discussion of murder in the second degree is not within the scope of
this Comment.
86. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981).
87. Id. § 2502(c).
88. Id. § 2502(d).
89. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 468 Pa. 575, 581-83, 364 A.2d 665, 669
(1976); Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 235, 352 A.2d 30, 35-36 (1976).
It should be noted that these cases arose under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code
as it existed prior to amendments which broke murder down into three, rather
than two, degrees. Prior to the amendments, murder of the first degree in-
cluded both felony murder and intentional killing, while murder of the second
degree included all other kinds of murder. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2502
(Purdon 1973) (current version at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (Purdon Supp.
1980-1981). The new Code has simply given felony murder its own degree, and
moved old murder of the second degree to murder of the third degree. See
Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 439, 378 A.2d 1189, 1194 (1977). In
Polimeni, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that:
Murder of the first degree and of the second degree under the Crimes
Code together correspond to murder in the first degree under prior
law; the new murder of the first degree is an intentional killing, while
the new murder of the second degree is felony-murder. Murder of the
third degree is comprised of "all other kinds of murder", 18 Pa. C.S.
§ 2502(c) (Supp. 1977-1978), thus taking the place of the former murder
in the second degree, which the Penal Code described in the same
words.
Id. Thus, for purposes of discerning the distinction between the new grades
of first degree murder and third degree murder, analyses of the differences
between old first degree-intentional murder not felony murder-and old murder
of the second degree have been used.
90. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 468 Pa. 575, 581-83, 364 A.2d 665, 669
(1976). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated that "Lo]ur cases have
consistently held that the requirement of premeditation and deliberation is met
[VOL. 26: p. 105
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the other hand, the prosecution must prove only intent to inflict grievous
bodily harm to support a conviction for murder of the third degree. 91
This lesser degree of murder requires an unlawful killing with malice,
but without the specific and premeditated intention of taking a life.92
While it is tempting to seize upon the statutory language of pre-
meditation and assume that it requires there to be some evidence of
design or plan in order to establish murder of the first degree, it should
be noted that in Pennsylvania, premeditation may be found whenever a
,showing is made that there exists a conscious purpose to bring about
death,93 and that such a purpose may be found to have been formulated
in a fraction of a second. 94 The courts have held that, as with legal
malice,95 specific intent to kill may be inferred from the intentional use
-of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body. 6 The law on this
double inference is not altogether clear, however, as is pointed out by
Justice Manderino's vigorous dissent in Commonwealth v. O'Searo.97
He maintained that, while the drawing of an inference that use of a
deadly weapon on a vital part of the body supports a finding of intent
whenever there is conscious purpose to bring about death." Commonwealth v.
O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 239, 352 A.2d 30, 37 (1976).
91. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 463-64, 378 A.2d 1199, 1206-07
(1977).
92. Commonwealth v. Carter, 481 Pa. 495, 498-99, 393 A.2d 13, 15 (1978).
93. Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 239-40, 352 A.2d 30, 37-38
(1976). Specifically, the court in O'Searo stated:
The term "specific intent-to-kill" is a phrase that has been developed
by the courts of this jurisdiction to express the state of mind which
characterizes the intent which accompanies a killing which was willful,
deliberate and premeditated as required by the statute .... Such intent
supplies the qualities of willfulness, deliberation and premeditation
otherwise essential, by the statute, to murder in the first degree."
Id. at 234-35, 352 A.2d at 35, quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522,
525-26, 50 A.2d 317, 319 (1947) (emphasis added).
94. Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 16 (1868).
The law fixes upon no length of time as necessary to form the inten-
tion to kill, but leaves the existence of a fully formed intent as a fact
to be determined by the jury .... [i]t is equally true both in fact and
from experience that no time is too short for a wicked man to frame
in his mind his scheme of murder, and to contrive the means of
accomplishing it." But this expression must be qualified, lest it mis-
lead .... [T]his suddenness is opposed to premeditation, and a jury
must be well convinced upon the evidence that there was time to
deliberate and premeditate. The law regards, and the jury must find,
the actual intent; that is to say, the fully formed purpose to kill, with
so much time for deliberation and premeditation, as to convince
them . . . that the mind has become fully conscious of its own design.
Id., quoting Judge Rush in the early case of Commonwealth v. Richard Smith
(emphasis in original).
95. See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
96. Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 236, 352 A.2d 30, 36 (1976).
97. 466 Pa. 224, 241-44, 352 A.2d 30, 38-40 (1976) (Manderino, J., dis-
senting).
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to kill for the purpose of classifying a homicide as murder,9 8 the infer-
ence that such conduct also shows the specific intent necessary to support
a charge of first degree murder is not permissible. 99 He contended that
the cases relied upon by the O'Searo majority' 0 0 actually involved a
finding, apart from the use of the deadly weapon, that "the defendant
not only intended to kill, but had time for willful, deliberate, and pre-
meditated reflection .... " 101 Despite Justice Manderino's criticism,
however, and over his continuing dissents, 1 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme,
Court has consistently stated the law as allowing both inferences from
the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body.108 It must be
noted, however, that, while this inference of specific intent is permissible,
it is by no means mandatory. 0 4
Additionally, it is the actual presence or absence of the clear, con-
scious purpose of taking a life which is controlling. 0 5 Therefore, in
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 0 6 the court allowed the jury to consider evi-
dence of the ferocity and viciousness of gang wars in the weeks preceding
the defendant's act of homicide, introduced by the defendant to establish
that, at the time of the killing, he was in such a terror-stricken panic as
to negate the existence of reflection and conscious purpose necessary to
sustain a conviction of first degree murder. 0 7 Additionally, in Common-
wealth v. Walzack 08 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first admitted
98. Id. at 241, 352 A.2d at 38 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 241-42, 352 A.2d at 38-39 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 242-43, 352 A.2d at 39 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 301-02, 396 A.2d
1177, 1181 (1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 481
Pa. 426, 435, 392 A.2d 1366, 1370 (1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting); Common-
wealth v. Kingsley, 480 Pa. 560, 579, 391 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1978) (Manderino,
J., dissenting).
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 297, 396 A.2d 1177,
1179 (1978); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 481 Pa. 426, 430-31, 392 A.2d 1366,
1368 (1978); Commonwealth v. Kingsley, 480 Pa. 560, 570, 391 A.2d 1027, 1032(1978).
104. Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. at 239, 352 A.2d at 37.
105. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 461 Pa. 274, 279, 336 A.2d 282, 285 (1975).
106. 461 Pa. 274, 336 A.2d 282 (1975).
107. Id. at 282-83, 336 A.2d at 285. The court held that the lower court
erred in barring evidence of the viciousness of previous gang fights which had
been offered to substantiate the defendant's claim that terror-stricken panic,
induced by his knowledge of these past events, prevented the sort of reflection
and conscious purpose necessary for conviction of first degree murder. Id. at
282, 336 A.2d at 286. The defendant attempted to introduce evidence that
gang shootings had been frequent during the weeks preceding the incident, that
street gang members often carried deadly weapons into battles, and that the
defendant had once been hospitalized as a result of an injury received in a
street fight. Id.
108. 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914 (1976).
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-expert psychological testimony to determine the defendant's capacity to
formulate the specific intent necessary for a conviction of murder of the
first degree. 109
While distinctions between the degrees of murder may be less than
.clear, they are, without question, critically important, since they will
control the penalties imposed upon a convicted defendant. 110 While
murder of the first degree is punishable by sentences of life imprison-
ment or death,"' murder of the third degree carries a maximum sentence
of twenty years imprisonment.1 2
B. Voluntary Manslaughter
Less serious than murder in terms of culpability and punishment
is voluntary manslaughter. 113 A person who kills another without law-
ful justification "commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the
killing, he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from
serious provocation," 114 or with the unreasonable belief that the killing
109. Id. at 212-13, 360 A.2d at 915. In Walzack, the court heard testimony
to the effect that, as a result of a frontal lobotomy, the defendant did not possess
sufficient mental capacity to formulate specific intent to kill. Id. at 215, 360
A.2d at 916. Justice Eagen dissented in Walzack, essentially because of his
distrust of the reliability of psychological evidence. Id. at 224-26, 360 A.2d at
921-22 (Eagen, J., dissenting).
110. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981)
(sentence for first degree murder); § 2502(c) (defining third degree murder as
a first degree felony); id. § 1103(1) (sentence for a first degree felony).
111. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981). Deter-
mination of which of the two statutorily provided penalties will be imposed
is reserved until after a sentence hearing at which the jury that convicted the
defendant hears evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Id.
§ 1311. Aggravating circumstances include a showing that the victim was a
public official performing his duty, the murder involved a contract killing, the
victim was a prisoner or hostage of the defendant, the victim was a prosecution
witness killed in an attempt to prevent testimony, or that the offense was com-
mitted by torture. Id. § 1311(d). Among the mitigating circumstances are the
fact that the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental disturbance,
'could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or acted under duress; the
fact that the victim participated in the homicidal act; or any other evidence of
mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant or the circum-
stances of the killing. Id. § 1311(e). After hearing the evidence, the jury must
decide unanimously on a sentence. Id. § 1311(a)(4). If the sentence is death,
the jury must set forth the findings upon which it is based. Id. § 1311(f)(1).
112. Murder of the third degree constitutes a felony of the first degree.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(c) (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981). The maximum
penalty for a first degree felony is 20 years in prison. Id. § 1103(1).
113. Voluntary manslaughter is classified as a felony of the second degree.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(c) (Purdon 1973). This lesser degree of felony
is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years. Id. § 1103(2).
114. Id. § 2503(a). See Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 441,
:378 A.2d 1189, 1195 (1977). In an effort to clarify the rationale said to under-
lie the heat of passion rule, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has said: "In
murder, the intent to kill is the product of reflection, in voluntary manslaughter
the conduct is inspired by passion resulting from sufficient legal provocation."
,Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. at 240 n.6, 352 A.2d at 38 n.6.
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is justified. 1" 5 Provocation must be found to be adequate to reduce
murder to voluntary manslaughter." 6 The general test for adequacy is
an objective test,"17 specifically, "whether a reasonable man, confronted
with this series of events became impassioned to the extent that his
mind was 'incapable of cool reflection.'" 118 Adequate provocation,
however, is not restricted to a response to one event, and may be estab-
lished by the cumulative impact of a series of occurrences," 9 with psy-
chological testimony as to the effect of the cumulation of events being
admissible.12 0
However, cumulative effect must be distinguished from reliance on
past events to excuse a homicide where in fact extreme passion, resulting
from the event or events, cannot be shown to exist at the time of the
115. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(b) (Purdon 1973). The statute desig-
nates a homicide as voluntary manslaughter if the accused, at the time he
knowingly or intentionally inflicts the mortal wound, believes the circum-
stances to be such that they would justify the killing, but his belief is unrea-
sonable. Id. See Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 441, 378 A.2d
1189, 1195 (1977).
116. Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 304, 380 A.2d 362, 366
(1977); Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 17 (1868) (insulting or scandalous
words not sufficient provocation, nor are actual indignities to the person of a
light and trivial kind).
117. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2301 (Purdon 1973). See also Common-
wealth v. Miller, 473 Pa. 398, 399, 374 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1977) (per curiam);
Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 389, 292 A.2d 286, 289 (1972);
note 118 and accompanying text infra. Thus, taking as true the stated
subjective impression of provocation held by the defendant at the time of
the killing, the question becomes whether, objectively, his impression of the
situation and impassioned reaction thereto was reasonable.
118. Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 304, 380 A.2d 362, 366,
(1977), quoting Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 389-90, 292 A.2d
286, 290 (1972) (footnote omitted). Sufficient passion is held to render the
mind incapable of the cool reflection necessary for murder. Commonwealth v.
Cambric, 475 Pa. 454, 457 n.4, 380 A.2d 1224, 1225 n.4 (1977).
119. Commonwealth v. Solomon, 471 Pa. 417, 418, 370 A.2d 372, 373
(1977); Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 389, 292 A.2d 286, 290'
(1972).
In McCusker, the court found that certain facts within the knowledge of
the defendant at the time of the killing could be found sufficient to constitute
adequate provocation. It stated:
To establish sufficient provocation appellant relied on three events
immediately preceding the slaying: his awareness within the last month
before the crime that his wife had entered into meretricious rela-
tionship with his step brother; his knowledge within minutes of the
crime that his wife was perhaps pregnant with his step brother's child;
and his wife's threat immediately before the crime that she was going
to leave defendant and take with her his only child.
448 Pa. at 389, 292 A.2d at 289-90. It reversed the judgment of conviction
for failure to admit psychiatric evidence seeking to establish this heat of
passion defense. Id. at 395, 292 A.2d at 293.
120. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 387, 389, 292 A.2d 286,
289 (1972).
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killing.121 Additionally, it appears that where the courts have allowed
psychiatric testimony regarding the cumulative effect of a series of events
to show provocation, the accused's conduct was triggered by some final
event and the fatal act was an immediate response. 22
In Commonwealth v. Carroll,2 s a husband unsuccessfully invoked
the heat of passion argument. 124 Following a lengthy argument with his
nagging, apparently sadistic wife, and after she had fallen asleep, the
defendant shot her twice in the head with a gun which had earlier been
placed near the bed at the victim's request. 25  The defendant's psy-
chiatric expert testified that the defendant was
for a number of years . . . passively going along with a situa-
tion which he [was] not controlling and he . . . [was] not
making any decisions, and finally a decision . . . [was] forced
on him . . . . [H]is wife issued an ultimatum that if he went
and gave this training course she would leave him . . . . He
was so dependent upon her he didn't want her to leave. He
couldn't make up his mind what to do. He was trapped ....
[R]age, desperation, and panic [produced] an impulsive
automatic reflex type of homicide, . . . as opposed to an in-
tentional premeditated type of homicide. 126
Emphatically rejecting this "irresistible impulse" argument, the Carroll
court reasoned that allowing such an excuse to reduce the degree of
murder would leave society almost unprotected.127 While the decision
121. See Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 380 A.2d 362 (1977).
In Whitfield, the accused stabbed her mother's common law husband in the
throat approximately one hour after an argument over a minor matter. Id.
at 300, 380 A.2d at 364. The court found that the argument over a trivial
matter was not sufficient provocation to sustain a heat of passion defense. Id.
Additionally, the court held that evidence that the victim had sexually abused
the accused during her adolescence would not suffice because the abuse had
occurred over seven years before the homicide. Id. at 301, 305, 380 A.2d at
.364, 366.
122. Compare Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286
.(1972) (psychiatric testimony regarding the defendant's knowledge that his
wife was intimately involved with his step-brother and might be carrying his
-child, and her threat to leave him made moments prior to the homicide, ad-
missible to show cumulative impact causing heat of passion) with Common-
wealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911 (1963) (evidence of wife's nagging
and abuse of couple's young children not sufficient to sustain an irresistable
impulse defense where the husband had shot his wife long after the argument
and after she had fallen asleep).
123. 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911 (1963).
124. Id. at 536, 194 A.2d at 917.
125. Id. at 528-29, 194 A.2d at 913-14. The wife had forced him to quit a
good job, and he suspected that she abused their two young children. Id.
126. Id. at 534-35, 194 A.2d at 916 (intra-sentence ellipses by the court).
127. Id. at 537, 194 A.2d at 917-18, quoting Commonwealth v. Tyrrell, 405
Pa. 210, 220-21, 174 A.2d 852, 856-57 (1961); Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal
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in Carroll rested quite heavily on the court's distrust of the proffered
psychiatric testimony,128 twelve years later the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court explicitly endorsed the use of psychiatric testimony in determining
whether a defendant acted in the heat of passion, in Commonwealth v.
McCusker."9 Distinguishing Carroll from McCusker, however, is the
fact that the Carroll court apparently found that the defendant's argu-
ment amounted to a plea of "irresistible impulse," 130 a theory the
Pennsylvania courts still reject.' 8 '
Once adequate provocation is found, attention focuses upon the
defendant's response. 18 2 The analysis involves three factors: 1) whether
the defendant actually acted in the heat of passion, 2) whether the
provocation directly led to the killing, and 3) whether insufficient cool-
ing off time had elapsed, preventing the defendant from using his
reasoning powers and capacity to reflect.'8 3 In dealing with this second,
essentially subjective, level of inquiry, psychiatric testimony may be
admitted to prove the defendant's actual response to the provocation. 8 4
Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761, 762 (1956). It must be stressed, however,
that the issue in Carroll was not whether the testimony of psychiatrists was
admissible as bearing on the defendant's state of mind, but rather whether
that testimony once given required the trial court to fix the degree of guilt no,
higher than what is now murder in the third degree. 412 Pa. at 527-28, 194
A.2d at 913.
128. 412 Pa. at 536, 194 A.2d at 917. Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Bell concluded that: "[T]he Courts cannot abdicate to the psychiatrists,
the task of determining criminal responsibility [and] cannot remit to psychia-
trists the right to determine the intent or the state of mind of an accused at
the time of the commission of a homicide." Id. Noting that expert opinion
testimony was entitled to little weight when compared to positive facts, and
that the opinion of this defendant's psychiatrist was necessarily based on the
defendant's self-serving and feigned statements regarding his state of mind,
Chief Justice Bell concluded that the "psychiatrists's opinion [was] ...entitlect
to very little weight, . . . especially when the defendant's own actions
belie the opinion." Id. at 535, 194 A.2d at 917.
129. 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972). See notes 119 & 122 supra.
130. 412 Pa. at 534-35, 537, 194 A.2d at 916, 918.
131. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 214, 360 A.2d 914,
916 (1976). Irresistible impulse does not amount to an insanity plea. Rather,
the defendant contends that the circumstances and emotional state produce an
"impulsive, automatic reflex type of homicide . . .as opposed to an intentional
premeditated type of homicide." Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. at 534-35,
194 A.2d at 916. According to one commentator, more than a few jurisdic-
tions have added an irresistible impulse test to their criminal law. W. LAFAVE
& A. ScoTr, supra note 13, at 283. Critics find the test both too restrictive, in
that it does not go far enough beyond the insanity plea, and too liberal in that
it broadens the controlling criteria too far. Id. at 284.
132. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. at 390, 292 A.2d at 290.
133. Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 305, 380 A.2d 362, 366.
(1977), quoting Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. at 390, 292 A.2d at 290.
134. Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. at 391-92, 292 A.2d at 291-92.
Psychiatric testimony is admissible in thi's situation to show either the psycho-
logical likelihood of the defendant's behavior under a given stimulus, or his
capacity to form the specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa-
at 229, 352 A.2d at 32.
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C. Self Defense
Pennsylvania attaches no blame or penalty to conduct which might
,otherwise be criminal, if the conduct is found to have been justified. 3 5
Among the justifiable conduct statutorily provided for is the use of
deadly force against another when "the actor believes that such force is
necessary to protect himself against death [or] serious bodily injury
... ,, 138 Under this language, the belief in harm must not only be
an actual subjective belief, but must be reasonable as well.137 In de-
termining the subjective or actual fear, the courts will consider evidence
of the victim's past behavior, if such evidence was known to the de-
fendant and could have contributed to his fear.'3 8 In addition, courts
will allow psychiatric testimony as to the accused's state of mind to
establish the subjective belief.139 But the courts have expressly rejected
the use of psychiatric testimony if offered to prove the reasonableness
of the defendant's belief, holding that the standard is an objective
standard and so peculiarities of the particular defendant's psyche are
irrelevant.' 40 However, in analyzing reasonableness, the courts will view
the facts as they appeared to the defendant at the time of the killing.' 41
Applying the justification standard as set out above, 42 the courts
have generally found that the fact that the attacker was unarmed will
render the use of deadly force in response much harder to justify.143
135. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 502 (Purdon 1973). Chapter 5 of the Penn-
sylvania Crimes Code provides generally for the defenses of justification and
excuse for conduct which would otherwise be classified as criminal. Conduct
which the defendant believes is necessary to prevent harm either to himself or
another individual may be found to be justified. See id. §§ 505-506.
136. Commonwealth v. Black, 474 Pa. 47, 53, 376 A.2d 627, 630 (1977),
quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2) (Purdon 1973). The court ex-
plained that the statute, as interpreted by case law, provides that:
[T]o establish the defense of self-defense it must be shown that a)
the slayer was free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty
which resulted in the slaying; b) that the slayer must have reasonably
believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm. and that there was a necessity to use such force in order to
save himself therefrom; and c) the slayer did not violate any duty to
retreat or to avoid the danger.
474 Pa. at 53, 876 A.2d at 630 (emphasis by the court).
137. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501 (Purdon 1973) (defining "belief" as
reasonable belief). See also Commonwealth v. Black, 474 Pa. 47, 53, 376 A.2d
627, 630 (1977). If such belief is unreasonable, the claim of self-defense will
fail, but the defendant might use an unreasonable belief to have the homicide
-classified as voluntary manslaughter. See notes 114-15 and accompanying text
.supra.
138. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 483 Pa. 176, 180, 394 A.2d 968, 970 (1978).
139. Commonwealth v. Light, 458 Pa. 328, 334, 326 A.2d 288, 292 (1974).
140. Id. at 334, 338, 326 A.2d at 292, 294.
141. Id. at 334, 326 A.2d at 292.
142. See notes 135-41 and accompanying text supra.
143. Commonwealth v. Jones, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 300, 305-06, 332 A.2d
464, 466 (1974). But see Commonwealth v. Eberle, 474 Pa. 548, 379 A.2d 90
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As a general rule, a person is required to retreat rather than use deadly
force, if he can do so safely. 44  No such duty to retreat is imposed,
however, when the person is threatened within his home or place of'
work, unless the attacker also resides or works there.145  Once evidence
is presented that the defendant was in actual fear for his life, 146 and that
such a belief was reasonable, 47 the prosecution must prove that the
defendant was not in fact acting in self defense. 48  It should be noted
that some commentators, 49 and at least one court,150 have raised the
argument that the self defense doctrine as traditionally expressed and
understood, amounts to a prejudicial statement of the law which might
(1977). In Eberle, the court found sufficient grounds to support a self-defense
Flea where the victim was an unarmed male; the accused female used deadly
orce, and the homicide occurred following an argument in which the victim,
an occasional live-in quest who had arrived exceedingly drunk, had ripped down
shelves and lunged at the defendant. Id. at 551-52, 379 A.2d at 92. For a dis-
cussion of the male-orientation of traditional notions of justification, and
whether such notions amount to a violation of a woman's equal protection
rights, see notes 149-51 and accompanying text infra.
144. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2)(ii) (Purdon 1973). See also Com-
monwealth v. Palmer, 467 Pa. 476, 481-82, 359 A.2d 375, 378 (1976).
145. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2)(ii)(A) (Purdon 1973). See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Eberle, 474 Pa. 548, 556-57, 379 A.2d 90, 95 (1977) (absence
of duty to retreat by the defendant, as found by the court, was predicated on
conclusion that the victm was not also a resident of the apartment despite his
possession of a key, storage of clothing on the premises, and occasional over-
night stays); Commonwealth v. Walker, 447 Pa. 146, 150, 288 A.2d 741, 743
(1972) ("because both men were residents of the house, both had a duty to
retreat and cease the fight."). Id.
146. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(a) (Purdon 1973). See notes 136-37 and
accompanying text supra.
147. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2) (Purdon 1973). See notes 137
& 140-41 and accompanying text supra.
148. Commonwealth v. Black, 474 Pa. 47, 53, 376 A.2d 627, 630 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Walley, 466 Pa. 363, 367-68, 353 A.2d 396, 399 (1976).
149. Representation of Women, supra note 1, at 153-56. The author's
note:
Sex bias permeates the legal doctrine regarding the perception of
imminent and lethal danger. The law assumes that both the attacker
and the victim have approximately equal capacities. While a man
is assumed to have the ability to perceive danger accurately and re-
spond appropriately, a woman is viewed as responding hysterically
and inappropriately to physical threat. However, certain factors
relevant to women's experiences are not taken into account. For
example, women are less likely to have had trainng or experience in
hand-to-hand fighting. Socially imposed proscriptions inhibit their
ability to fend off an attacker. The fact that women generally are of
slighter build also gives a male assailant an advantage. All of these
conditions will have an impact on the reasonableness of a woman's
perception of an imminent and lethal threat to her life such as would
justify the use of deadly force. These factors, however, have not
usually been considered during the trial.
Id. at 153.
150. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
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rise to the level of a denial of due process and equal protection to
women.15'
V. THE LAW APPLIED TO THE HYPOTHETICALS
Given this state of the law of homicide in Pennsylvania, analysis
will now focus on fitting each of the hypothetical defendants into the
structure described to determine whether charges of first degree murder,
third degree murder or voluntary manslaughter can be sustained against
Alice, Barbara, and Cathy.
All three of the hypothetical defendants could be charged with
murder in the first degree under the deadly weapon to a vital part of
the body presumption. 52 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ex-
plained that the deadly weapon inference rests on the principle that,
absent evidence to the contrary, a person is presumed to know and in-
tend the probable results of his conduct. 153 Thus, each of the three
defendants could be presumed to have intended the death that resulted
from their uses of the knives. In order to reduce the charge of murder
of the first degree to murder of the third degree, the jury must be pre-
sented with evidence sufficient to overcome this inference, and to permit
it to find a lack of premeditation.3 4
For Alice, the fact that she waited for Archie to go to bed and fall
asleep, and then went to the kitchen to get the knife, supports a finding
of premeditation, even without the deadly weapon presumption, by in-
dicating the sort of design and conscious purpose of killing required for
conviction of first degree murder. 55 Arguing against this classic example
151. Id. at 240-41, 559 P.2d at 558-59. According to the Wanrow court,
the self defense instruction implies that the jury should apply an objective
standard measured by a situation in which a male antagonist faces another
male. Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 548, 558-59. By imposing that male image,
the court found that the instruction denied the woman defendant her right
to equal protection by preventing the jury from considering her size and
physical training in relation to that of her opponent. Id. The court concluded
that "the [defendant] was entitled to have the jury consider her actions in the
light of her own perceptions which were the product of our nation's long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination." Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 559, quoting
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
152. Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. at 237, 352 A.2d at 37. See
notes 95-96 and accompanying text supra.
153. Id.
154. See notes 104-09 and accompanying text supra.
155. Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. at 239-40, 352 A.2d at 37; Com-
monwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 525, 50 A.2d 317, 319 (1947). In Jones,
the amount of elapsed time between the provocation and the killing, and the
defendant's actions in obtaining a weapon and seeking out his victim, were
found by the court to corroborate the inference of the existence of intent
to kill and premediation which had been inferred from the use of a deadly
weapon on a vital part of the body. 355 Pa. at 526, 50 A.2d at 319.
Both the majority and the dissent in Commonwealth v. O'Searo, cited
W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 13, for the proposition that evidence as
to the defendant's actions prior to the homicide-planning activities directed
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of premeditation would indeed be difficult for Alice.156 Barbara and
Cathy, however, have better arguments against premeditation. 57 The
impulsive nature of their actions would lend some credibility to their
defenses. 158 However, the fact that, well before the incident, Cathy
deliberately placed the knife in the drawer weakens her defense con-
siderably.15 9 Such action provides evidence of a plan, and thus pre-
meditation, to support the conscious purpose requirement of first degree
murder.160 The facts of Barbara's case fall more strongly in her favor,
but her defense is not unassailable. As noted above, the courts have
found that even a fraction of a second is sufficient time to formulate
premeditation, 161 so the absence of a lapse of time does not necessarily
assure her acquittal.
Having reached these results under traditional applications of the
law, attention will now focus on the outcomes which might be achieved
by shaping defenses to incorporate evidence regarding the Battered
Spouse Syndrome.' 62 Applying the doctrine set out in Commonwealth
v. Stewart, 63 which would allow introduction of evidence of terror-
stricken state of mind, 64 testimony regarding the Battered Spouse Syn-
drome and each defendant's experience should be admissible to negate
the premeditation required for first degree murder, 65 and so allow a
jury to acquit the defendant on first degree murder charges. 166 In
toward the killing-would support a conclusion that the killing was premedi-
tated. 466 Pa. at 240 n.5, 242, 352 A.2d at 38 n.5, 39.
156. For the arguments which might be raised, see notes 167-71, 191-94 &
203-06 and accompanying text infra.
157. See notes 158-68, 183-87, 198-202 & 212-24 and accompanying text
infra.
158. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(a) & (d) (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981).
See also notes 86-90 & 93-94 and accompanying text supra.
159. See Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. at 536, 194 A.2d at 917; notes
-93-94 and accompanying text supra.
160. See notes 89-94 and accompanying text supra.
161. See Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 446 Pa. 224, 352 A.2d 30 (1976); Com-
monwealth v. Earnest, 342 Pa. 544, 21 A.2d 38 (1941); Commonwealth v. Scott,
284 Pa. 159, 130 A. 317 (1925). See also notes 89-94 and accompanying text
s.upra.
162. See notes 24-62 and accompanying text supra.
163. 461 Pa. 274, 336 A.2d 282 (1975). See notes 105-07 and accompanying
text supra.
164. 461 Pa. at 282-83, 336 A.2d at 285. See notes 105-07 and accompany-
ing text supra.
165. See notes 88-90 and accompanying text supra.
166. Women suffering from the Battered Spouse Syndrome frequently live
in a state of constant terror. Steinmetz, supra note 4, at 330. Dr. Steinmetz
cites research on 60 battered women which suggests that the women were "a
study on paralyzing terror .... ." Id., citing Hilberman & Munson, Sixty Bat-
tered Women, 2 VicriMOLOGY 460, 464 (1977). One commentator quotes a
-woman as recounting the following:
I know the horrors of beating; of being shot at and pistol-whipped;
of being tied up to watch while my grave was being dug; of having
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Barbara's and Cathy's cases, the terror-stricken state more closely re-
sembles that present in Stewart 1'6 7-specifically, a history of violence
with immediate events triggering a perception of similar, imminent vio-
lence.168 A jury could probably comprehend these panic stricken states
without expert testimony. All that is required for this approach is that
the court admit, as relevant, testimony regarding the past instances of
violence. In Alice's case, however, a substantial period of time elapsed
and more evidence of conscious design exists, 1609 presenting a more diffi-
cult burden of proof. Applying the principle that it is the actual forma-
tion of specific intent to kill, and not just the passage of time, that is
controlling in finding first degree murder,170 an argument might be made
for acquitting Alice on the first degree murder charges. By establishing
that Alice was in a continuing state of terror-stricken panic, the defense
could show she could not formulate the specific intent necessary to sup-
port a conviction. 171 However, it is likely that a jury would not be able
to comprehend Alice's prolonged terror-stricken state, and would not
overcome the natural assumption of premeditation which arises from
the amount of elapsed time, without the benefit of expert testimony on
the effects of the Battered Spouse Syndrome.
Pennsylvania allows expert testimony regarding phenomena not
within the common knowledge of the average juror,172 and defines an
expert witness as someone who, because of his possession of certain knowl-
edge not within the reach of the ordinary person, is particularly qualified
to speak on a given subject. 173 Thus, if the Battered Spouse Syndrome
is viewed as a phenomenon beyond the ordinary knowledge of the jury,
expert testimony regarding its effect might be admissible. However,
unless the battered spouse's condition is presented as a special syndrome,
a convincing argument could be raised that the effects that living in the
my husband hold a gun to my child's head demanding obedience and
threatening to pull the trigger; of trying to prevent my 12 year old
daughter from being raped by my husband, while Father laughs and
states, 'I am king of this house and can do as I damn well please.'
I and my children have received many beatings. I have cigarette burns
on my arms, a broken nose, cracked chest and ribs, a concussion and a
cracked pelvic bone. My children were terrorized by their father's
attempt to run over my 4 year old son, and by his act of beheading our
pet horse.
I tried separation but was brought back to the house at gunpoint.
He has told me repeatedly that neither my children nor myself would
ever be free from him and that he would stop at nothing to destroy us.
Meyers, supra note 4, at 48.
167. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
168. 461 Pa. at 277, 282, 336 A.2d at 285-87.
169. See Part II, Hypothetical 1, supra.
170. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 461 Pa. at 279, 336 A.2d at 285. See notes
105-07 and accompanying text supra.
171. Id.
172. Collins v. Zediker, 421 Pa. 52, 53, 218 A.2d 776, 777 (1966).
173. Steele v. Shepperd, 411 Pa. 481, 192 A.2d 397, 398 (1963).
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battered spouse's situation would have on an individual are inferences
to be drawn by the jury from testimony regarding what has occurred,
and are not proper subjects for conclusory statements by an expert. In
Ibn-Tamas v. United States,174 a medical expert's testimony regarding
the Battered Spouse Syndrome was offered in defense to a murder
,charge.17n The trial court rejected the testimony.176  The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals remanded the case because it could not tell
from the record why the court below had barred the testimony. 177 In
remanding, however, the court took the further step of approving
the Battered Spouse Syndrome as an appropriate subject for expert
testimony. 78
Moving on, it is possible that Alice, Barbara and Cathy can employ
evidence of the Battered Spouse Syndrome not just to reduce the degree
of murder, but rather to gain acquittal on the murder charges altogether.
If the defendants can use testimony regarding the effects of the Battered
Spouse Syndrome to show that they lacked malice 179 when they killed,
they could achieve that result. The defendants could show lack of
malice by establishing either of two conditions: 1) that they acted under
a sudden and intense passion resulting from provocations; 180 or 2) that
they subjectively, albeit unreasonably, believed the killings were justi-
.fied.18 Under the unreasonable belief in justification branch, 8 2 Barbara
and Cathy can present stronger cases for reduction in degree than can
Alice, but again, none has a pat argument. 8 Both Bill and Carl ap-
proached their wives unarmed, a factor which has traditionally increased
the burden in justifying use of deadly force,'8 4 and which makes
Barbara's and Cathy's allegations of actual belief in justification harder
to prove. s 5 Nevertheless, Cathy could argue that, based on the effects
174. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
175. Id. at 628.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 638. The court noted that it is acceptance of the reliability of
the particular methodology employed in an emerging field, not the quantity of
substantive knowledge available in the field, which qualifies an area as an
appropriate subject for expert testimony. Id. at 638.
179. For a description of the malice requirement necessary to raise a homi-
cide to murder, see notes 74-79 and accompanying text supra.
180. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(a) (Purdon's 1973). See note 114 and
accompanying text supra.
181. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(b) (Purdon 1973). See also note 115
and accompanying text supra. It must be recalled that if the defendant's belief
is reasonable, the more appropriate plea is absolute justification under self
defense. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (Purdon 1973). See notes 135-51 and
accompanying text supra.
182. See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
183. See notes 184-94 and accompanying text infra.
184. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
185. Id.
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of the prior beatings, Carl's threats, and the fact that the beating was in
progress, she actually believed that her life, and the life of her unborn
child, were in danger. 8 6 The placing of the knife in the drawer, how-
ever, may be found to be evidence of some design in the homicide, and
might make Cathy's proffered justification appear to be merely an excuse
for murder. On the other hand, properly presented, that conduct might
serve as evidence of her continuing fear and so tend to support her
belief in the imminent danger. Cumulative evidence is admissible to
show heat of passion generated by adequate accumulated provocation,
when presented by a defendant seeking to reduce a murder charge to
voluntary manslaughter.' 87
In Barbara's case, the threat to life is less evident. Bill did not
attack her, but did begin the insults and verbal abuse which had regu-
larly preceded his beatings.'88 While a defendant's belief in imminent
danger need not be reasonable under this theory, 8 9 the more unreason-
able the accused's perception appears, the more difficult it will be to
convince a jury of the defendant's subjective belief. To overcome this
credibility problem, Barbara might employ evidence of the Battered
Spouse Syndrome to show the terror which Bill's behavior, historically
an indicator of imminent physical attack, might invoke in her.190
Alice once again faces the problem of the time lapse between the
beating and her homicidal conduct.19 ' Under traditional notions of
danger, it is unlikely that Alice could convince a jury that she feared
death-reasonably or unreasonably-at the time she killed Archie.192 Set
in the context of the Battered Spouse's state of desperation, 9 3 however,
Alice's contention that she actually feared for her life becomes more
plausible, especially in view of Archie's threats to kill Alice and their
child, and his behavior upon finding them when they had left. Alice's
defense would turn on the judge's allowing as relevant, and the jury's
believing as credible, evidence of the constant and continuing fear created
by years of entrapment in a hopeless and brutal marriage. 94
The second avenue available for reducing the charges against the
three defendants is the heat of passion branch of voluntary man-
186. See Part II, Hypothetical 3, supra.
187. Commonwealth v. Solomon, 471 Pa. 417, 418, 370 A.2d 372, 373 (1977);
Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 389, 292 A.2d 286, 290 (1972). See
notes 119-20 and accompanying text supra.
188. See Part II, Hypothetical 2, supra.
189. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(b) (Purdon 1973). See also note 115
and accompanying text supra.
190. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
191. See notes 117-20 and accompanying text supra.
192. To justify the use of deadly force, the feared violence must be immi-
nent or immediate. See notes 136-37 and accompanying text supra. See also
'W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 13, at 394.
193. See notes 41-56 and accompanying text supra.
194. See notes 46-55 and accompanying text supra.
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slaughter.195 Evidence that the defendants' actions were motivated by
intense passion 196 evoked by serious or adequate provocation 197 would
be necessary to successfully invoke this theory. Cathy has the strongest
case under the provocation theory. The vicious physical attack could
be found to be a serious provocation creating the sort of passion that
would negate malice. 198 Barbara would find it more difficult to establish
that Bill's insults amounted to provocation. 9o She might argue that
given the past scenarios in which Bill's insults led to increasingly brutal
assaults, his verbal abuse on the night of the stabbing triggered an in-
tense emotional response. Here, again, expert testimony on the effects
of the Battered Spouse Syndrome 200 would be necessary. 20' Helping
Barbara under this theory is the fact that the courts have found that
the cumulative impact of a series of events may be found to be adequate
provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter.202
Alice would face a more difficult task than would Barbara or Cathy
in pleading terror or cumulative impact. The elapsed time between the
beating and her action again seems to provide sufficient time for the
passion to cool 203 and for Alice to regain her capacity to think clearly.20 4
In order to sustain her defense, Alice would have to show intense
passion-essentially a continuing state of terror-which, because of the-
cumulative effects of her life as a battered spouse, did not diminish in
the time following the beating. For this, expert testimony on the.
Battered Spouse Syndrome 205 would be essential.206 It is submitted that
the success of all three defendants' attempts to reduce their murder-
charges would depend on the willingness of the courts to allow as rele-
195. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(a)(2) (Purdon 1973). See also
notes 114-18 and accompanying text supra.
196. Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. at 240 & n.6, 352 A.2d at 38 & n.6.
See notes 114-18 and accompanying text supra.
197. Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 305, 380 A.2d 362, 366.(1977). See notes 116-18 and accompanying text supra.
198. See notes 116-18 and accompanying text supra.
199. Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 17 (1868); see note 116 supra.
200. See notes 24-62 and accompanying text supra.
201. Representation of Women, supra note 1, at 162. The authors suggest
that to establish that a woman who has suffered years of physical and sexual
abuse by her husband has a particularly extreme reaction to similar assaults
will require careful explanation of background factors by an expert sociologist,
psychologist or psychiatrist. Id.
202. See note 119 and accompanying text supra. However, it must be
recalled that the courts distinguish cumulative impact from mere use of past
events to excuse a present homicidal conduct. See note 121 and accompanying
text supra. Merely carrying a grudge for past wrongs is differentiated from
responding to the accumulated effect of a continuing series of events. Id.
203. See Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 475 Pa. 297, 305, 380 A.2d 364, 366.-
See note 121 and accompanying text supra.
204. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
205. See notes 24-62 and accompanying text supra.
206. See note 201 and accompanying text supra.
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vant testimony regarding the abuse they have undergone, and permitting
testimony by expert witnesses on the peculiar mental condition identi-
fied as the Battered Spouse Syndrome.2°7
Discussion to this point has focused on reducing the seriousness of
the charges against each defendant.208 Attention will now turn to an
absolute defense: the self defense plea.20 9 The impaired mental state
defenses are often automatically relied upon by attorneys representing
women who commit violent acts.2 10 In the opinion of two attorneys
who have handled the defenses of a number of battered women, how-
ever, such homicides are more appropriately dealt with as cases of
self defense.211
On the facts of the hypotheticals, it would appear that Cathy has
the strongest case for pleading self defense-responding to a brutal as-
sault that she perceived to threaten not only her own life, but also that
of her unborn child, she could be found to have had a subjective appre-
hension of imminent death or great danger.212 The fact that Carl was
unarmed, however, will make it harder for Cathy to convince a jury of
her subjective fear 21 3 and the reasonableness of that fear.214 But Cathy's
pregnancy, the savageness of the beatings, and Carl's previous threats
provide the factual setting for Cathy's response and testimony regarding
that state of affairs would support her contention of actual fear.
Cathy may have more difficulty in showing that her fears were reason-
able. The courts apply an objective standard to determine reasonable-
207. See notes 24-62 & 174-78 and accompanying text supra.
208. See notes 152-207 and accompanying text supra.
209. See notes 135-51 and accompanying text supra.
210. Representation of Women, supra note 1, at 144.
211. Id. at 144, 160-61. The authors suggest that:
[A] self-defense approach should be thoroughly explored as a first step.
The traditional view of women who commit violent crimes is that their
action was irrational or insane. Consequently, an impaired mental
state defense has often been relied on automatically. We start from
the premise that a woman who kills is no more "out of her mind" than
a man who kills. Our work has shown that the circumstances which
require a woman to commit a homicide in these cases can demonstrate
that her act was reasonable and necessary. Accordingly, if possible,
the homicide should be defended as self-defense.
Id. at 144 (footnote omitted). They go on to observe:
Women generally have been viewed as more prone to hysteria and
panic than men. Women who violated that stereotype by being strong
and independent or violent were treated as hysterics. It is our belief
that many women who committed homicides and were considered dis-
turbed by society, their lawyers, and even themselves, might now be
viewed as having acted in self-defense.
Id. at 161, citing W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 13, at 573.
212. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(2) (Purdon 1973). See note 136 and
* accompanying text supra.
213. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
214. See notes 137 and accompanying text supra. See also Commonwealth
-v. Light, 458 Pa. 328, 338, 326 A.2d 288, 292 (1974).
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ness,215 and consider the issue an inappropriate subject for psychiatric
testimony. However, applying the principle of Commonwealth v.
Light 216 that reasonableness is judged on the facts as they appeared to
the defendant, the circumstances and background would support the
reasonableness of Cathy's use of deadly force. 21 7 Cathy might still have
difficulty in convincing a jury that her resort to deadly force was reason-
able in the face of an assault by an unarmed man.2 1 8 The self defense
doctrine is phrased in male terms and evokes an image of two men in
conflict. 219 Accurate and explicit testimony regarding the Battered
Spouse Syndrome will help diffuse this inherent prejudice,220 but unless
the courts are willing to adopt the reasoning of the Washington Supreme
Court in State v. Wanrow, 22' Cathy faces a difficult set of hurdles.
Barbara's case is not nearly as strong as Cathy's since Bill did not
touch her before she acted-he merely moved toward her. She might
argue, nevertheless, that, much like Dean Prosser's motionless highway
man, who was found to have committed an assault without speaking or
moving, 222 Bill communicated an implicit threat by his insults and ac-
cusations and by what Barbara knew them to preface. In this regard,
the rule that admits evidence of the victim's past behavior, if known to
the accused, to establish subjective apprehension, 223 will be helpful.
Perhaps more helpful is the admissibility of psychiatric testimony to
establish subjective fear of imminent danger. 224
While Barbara and Cathy's self defense claims might succeed as the
law stands, adding only an understanding and accommodation of the
Battered Spouse Syndrome, it appears that the law is far from ready to
condone Alice's conduct. It would be difficult indeed to convincingly
215. Commonwealth v. Light, 458 Pa. 328, 334, 326 A.2d 288, 292 (1974)
See note 140 and accompanying text supra.
216. 458 Pa. 328, 334, 326 A.2d 288, 292 (1974).
217. Id. See Representation of Women, supra note 1, at 153-54. The-
authors suggest that, in defending women who have struck back against abuse,
the individual woman's perspective must be presented. Id. They argue that
the judge and jury must be educated about the tragic situation of spouse abuse
and child abuse, the lack of official response to these problems, and the extent.
to which such abuse can explain the defendant's actions. Id.
218. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
219. See notes 149-51 and accompanying text supra.
220. Id.
221. See 88 Wash. 2d 221, 240-41, 554 P.2d 548, 558-59 (1977); notes 150-51
and accompanying text supra.
222. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 40 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser observed:
"It may be suggested that a perfectly motionless highwayman, standing with his
pistol pointed and his finger on the trigger, who . . . appears to the plaintiff's
view, commits an assault. It is the immediate physical threat which is impor-
tant, rather than the manner in which it is conveyed." Id.
223. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 483 Pa. 176, 180, 394 A.2d 968, 970 (1978).
See note 138 and accompanying text supra.
224. Commonwealth v. Light, 458 Pa. at 334, 326 A.2d at 292. See note,
139 and accompanying text supra.
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argue reasonable apprehension of imminent danger when Alice waited
so long after the beating to take action. Yet certainly, in view of the
data on the Battered Spouse Syndrome, 28 it is possible to posit a con-
tinuous, constant apprehension. However, such a view might be thought
to stretch self defense beyond what the doctrine will bear. Some suggest
that "[t]o in anyway advocate, even tacitly, that someone should use
deadly force at any other time than the time when his life is in im-
mediate danger, to allow a time lag, would be to condone murder." 226
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is submitted that the current legal system and its general unre-
sponsiveness to domestic violence 227 contributes to the psychological
conditioning identified as the Battered Spouse Syndrome, 228 and forces
battered women into the position where they perceive their only recourse
to be striking back at their abusers. 229 Whether that legal system pro-
vides justice in a situation it has helped to create will depend on its
response to research concerning the battered spouse.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that under Penn-
sylvania law, a battered spouse who kills her husband in response to
physical abuse might be able to reduce a first degree murder charge to
third degree murder based on lack of premeditated intent to kill,230 and
might reduce it even further under the heat of passion doctrine.23 '
However, analysis of the circumstances which force women to respond to
life-threatening situations suggests the appropriateness of a self defense
plea rather than an impaired mental state argument. 232 It is submitted,
however, that the law as it now stands is unresponsive to such an
approach. 233
It is further submitted that the law must take into account the
effects of the Battered Spouse Syndrome not only in grading a homicide,
but also in determining whether a killing might be excused as justified.
Some contend that such an application of the law would amount to
condoning murder.234 It is maintained, however, that, given the avail-
ability of research and expert testimony on the mental condition asso-
225. See notes 24-62 and accompanying text supra.
226. Meyers, supra note 4, at 48.
227. See notes 4-17 and accompanying text supra.
228. See notes 24-62 and accompanying text supra.
229. See notes 56-62 and accompanying text supra.
230. See notes 73-112 & 152-78 and accompanying text supra.
231. See notes 113-34 & 195-207 and accompanying text supra.
232. Representation of Women, supra note 1, at 144, 160. See note 211
and accompanying text supra.
233. See notes 213-14, 218-21 & 225-26 and accompanying text supra.
234. Meyers, supra note 4, at 48. See note 226 and accompanying text
supra.
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ciated with the Battered Spouse Syndrome285 and the ability to employ
expert testimony regarding mental state,236 such a step would not con-
done murder, but would instead represent a logical extension and ac-
curate application of the principles of culpability and justification
embodied in our legal system.
Doris Del Tosto
235. See notes 24-62 and accompanying text supra.
236. See notes 109 & 129 and accompanying text supra.
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss1/3
